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The usual models of endogenous growth treat knowledge codiﬁcation as a by-
product of R&D and as costless. In contrast to this, one can observe great
eﬀorts of private ﬁrms for the purposeful codiﬁcation of knowledge. We incor-
porate costly knowledge codiﬁcation in an overlapping generations framework of
endogenous growth and show that the steady-state growth rate of capital being
higher than that of the knowledge stock is a suﬃcient condition for knowledge
codiﬁcation. With decreasing codiﬁcation costs, every overlapping generations
economy will be codifying in the long run if the rate at which the costs decline
is higher than or equal to the steady-state growth rate of knowledge.
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Knowledge codiﬁcation is central to utilize the non-rivalry of ideas for economic growth.
The usual models of economic growth treat knowledge codiﬁcation as a by-product of
R&D-activities and as costless. In contrast to this, one can observe great eﬀorts by
private ﬁrms for the purposeful codiﬁcation of knowledge. The present paper develops
a formal model of endogenous growth that incorporates knowledge codiﬁcation as a
means of intergenerational knowledge transfer. It identiﬁes the circumstances under
which knowledge codiﬁcation takes place in the long run and studies its eﬀects on long
run economic development.
The empirical motivation for the paper are the following observations. Firstly, it is
widely reported that the codiﬁed knowledge base in the world has increased rapidly
over the last decades. For example, the European Union research project “Technology
and Infrastructures Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy” (TIPIK) has explic-
itly concentrated on “the fact that the rapid cumulative expansion of the codiﬁed
knowledge-base is the salient characteristic of the development of a modern economy
based on knowledge.” It is argued that “an in-depth understanding of the incentives
to codify,[...] [and] of the advantages and drawbacks of the codiﬁcation of knowledge,
is thus becoming essential for analyzing the process of innovation and growth of the
economy” (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). Similarly, “OECD analysis is increas-
ingly directed to understanding the dynamics of the knowledge-based economy and
its relationship to traditional economics, as reﬂected in ‘new growth theory’. The
growing codiﬁcation of knowledge and its transmission through communications and
computer networks has led to the emerging ‘information society’” (OECD, 1996, p. 3).
Secondly, codiﬁed knowledge is intentionally created, for example, within ‘knowledge
management’ of private ﬁrms. Aoshima (2002) reports that Japanese automobile pro-
ducers extensively use documentation on design know-how, testing results, and prob-
lematic and successful cases found in previous development activities as a means to
store knowledge about past practices. Another example is Sandia National Laborato-
ries, which conducted videotaped interviews to capture the extensive weapons design
and testing expertise of their aging and retired nuclear weapons designers (Sandia Na-
tional Laboratories, 1996). According to an empirical study by Edler (2003), 85% of the
497 ﬁrms from seven economic sectors which answered his questionnaire, stated that
they are creating organizational memory by preparing written documentation such as
lessons learned, training manuals, good work practice etc. In an online journal article,
it is reported that 2.1 billion US $ have been spent in 2000 for knowledge management
worldwide (Ball, 2002). At the end of the year 2000, a German consulting company
estimated a market volume for “information portals” until 2002 of 6.8 billion Euro
in Europe and of 1.61 billion Euro in the German market (Meta Group Deutschland
GmbH, 2001).
Thirdly, one major motivation for knowledge codiﬁcation within ﬁrms is to prevent
the loss of knowledge of retiring employees. This was indicated by above’s example
2of Sandia National Laboratories conducting videotaped interviews. In Edler’s study,
91% of the ﬁrms rated “to accelerate and improve the transfer of knowledge to new
workers” one or two on a scale from 1 (extremely important) to 6 (not important at
all) with regard to the motivations to use knowledge management. This was the most
important motivation. The third most often mentioned reason for knowledge manage-
ment was “to protect your ﬁrm or organization from loss of knowledge due to workers’
departure” which 82% of responding ﬁrms rated one or two.
In fact numerous cases are reported where productive knowledge has been lost or is at
risk of being lost. For example, Cowan et al. (2000) argue that “[...] where there are
critical bodies of knowledge that are not kept in more-or-less continuous use, inade-
quate codiﬁcation and archiving heightens the risks of ‘accidental uninvention’.” In a
recent newspaper article, a spokeswoman of a German high tech ﬁrm expressed con-
cerns about a third of the employees in their R&D-department being over 50 years of
age and soon becoming eligible for retirement. She claims that especially in research,
experience acquired over many years plays an important role as it is very costly if
young researchers replicate failures that the old have had before (Astheimer, 2005).
DeLong (2004) argues that due to an expected increase in retirements1, “problems of
poor documentation will become increasingly evident as more experienced employees
leave behind badly ﬂawed systems for preserving explicit knowledge about operations
and the context surrounding important decisions. The implicit or tacit knowledge these
veterans used to compensate for idiosyncratic documentation will be gone. What will
be left will be a lot of unusable paper and electronic ﬁles” (DeLong, 2004, p. 91).
Fourthly, although some information may accrue as a by-product of research and de-
velopment activities, for example, patent speciﬁcations or possibly the product itself,
empirical investigations such as Levin (1986) and Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) suggest that
this is not suﬃcient for knowledge to ﬂow freely. Instead substantial real resources
are often required to imitate an innovation, even one entirely lacking legal protection.
Levin (1986) concludes that public disclosure of a patent claim does not assure eventual
diﬀusion of the knowledge required to make economic use of an innovation. The study
of Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) found that in a seventh of the cases imitation cost was no
smaller than innovation cost. According to them, this was not due to any superiority
of the imitative product over the innovation, but to the innovator’s having a techno-
logical edge over its rivals in the relevant ﬁeld. “Often this edge was due to superior
‘know-how’ - that is, better and more extensive technical information based on highly
specialized experience with the development and production of related products and
processes. Such know-how is not divulged in patents and is relatively inaccessible (at
least for a period of time) to potential imitators” (Mansﬁeld et al., 1981, p. 910). In line
with this is Zucker et al. (1998)’s argument that particularly breakthrough inventions
“may be better characterized as creating (rivalrous) human capital – intellectual hu-
man capital – characterized by natural excludability as opposed to a set of instructions
1According to press reports, between 2002 and 2008, 75 percent of the U.S. Defense Department’s
civilian workforce of 675,000 people are expected to retire and the oil and gas production industry
expects to lose more than 60 percent of its employees by 2010 (Sandia National Laboratories, 1996;
Sapient Corporation, 2003; Farrell, 2002).
3for combining inputs and outputs which can be protected only by intellectual property
rights. This natural excludability arises from the complexity or tacitness of the knowl-
edge required to practice the innovation.” Based on both extensive interviews and
empirical work summarized in Zucker and Darby (1996), they believe that, “at least
for the ﬁrst 10 or 15 years, the innovations which underlie biotechnology are properly
analyzed in terms of naturally excludable knowledge held by a small initial group of
discoverers, their co-workers, and others who learned the knowledge from working at
the bench-science level with those possessing the requisite know-how” (Zucker et al.,
1998, p. 291).
The observations suggest that the knowledge transfer between generations is in general
imperfect and that purposeful and costly knowledge codiﬁcation is playing an impor-
tant role in the transfer of an economy’s productive knowledge.
From a theoretical viewpoint, new growth theory suggests that knowledge is non-rival.
The argument is that the use of an item of knowledge – whether it is the Pythagorean
theorem, a soft drink recipe or an algorithm to brew coﬀee – in one application makes
its use by someone else no more diﬃcult. However, although ideas themselves (e.g. the
Pythagorean theorem, a soft-drink recipe or an algorithm to brew coﬀee) are non-rival,
they possess direct economic relevance only in so far as they are embodied in either
persons or physical objects. We refer to ideas embodied in persons as human capital
or knowledge and to those embodied in physical objects as information2. Both are
rival. For example, an algorithm to brew coﬀee can be used by many people and cof-
fee machines simultaneously without deteriorating. It is non-rival (and disembodied).
However, to really have a cup of coﬀee, it needs a person or a machine to use this algo-
rithm. Hence, the idea of brewing coﬀee must be embodied in a person, who devotes
her eﬀort to this activity. This precludes the simultaneous use of her human capital by
another activity. Similarly, a coﬀee machine can brew only one kind of coﬀee at a time
at a ﬁnite quantity. The fact that ideas that are not embodied in someone or something
are not directly relevant economically is immediately obvious for all ideas that have
not yet been discovered or have been discovered and forgotten.3 Consequently long
run economic growth is generated by the accumulation of non-rival ideas in people and
physical objects. That is, by the accumulation of human capital and information.
A person, however, has only a ﬁnite number of years that can be spent acquiring ideas.
When this person dies, her human capital is lost. Any non-rival idea that this person
has discovered only lives on if it is either embodied in another person or as information.
The transformation of the codiﬁable part of knowledge via some code into information
is referred to as knowledge codiﬁcation.4 For example, using a natural language to
2Knowing an idea means to understand it. We do not ascribe the capacity to understand to physical
objects. For example, a person may be able to learn an idea, that is, understand it by attending to
a scientiﬁc paper. The paper, however, does not carry knowledge, because reading a scientiﬁc paper
does not automatically imply that this person can attach meaning to it, that is, knows more than
before.
3Boldrin and Levine (1999) strongly advocate this line of thinking.
4There is a discussion as to what extent knowledge may be codiﬁed. On the one hand, it is a function
4write down an idea in a book. As compared to human capital, information is long
lasting if properly maintained and it may be more easily accessible and distributed. In
this respect, it may be useful for an economic analysis to refer to an idea as codiﬁed, if
every individual of a certain group (e.g. employees of a ﬁrm) can access the informa-
tion independent of others. For instance, there are enough books containing the same
idea, such that anyone who is interested in it is able to use a copy, or there are enough
servers, such that anyone interested in an idea can download the information via the
internet or intranet. In this way, information has the property of a local public good,
and knowledge codiﬁcation can be interpreted as creating non-rival information from
rival human capital.
The standard approach in the endogenous growth theory uses the assumption that
knowledge codiﬁcation is an automatic by-product of research and development activi-
ties and can be treated as costless. The (implicit) argument is that when the innovative
product is sold at the market, an interested individual or potential competitor could
buy and reverse-engineer it. If the innovation is patented, this person could consult
the patent speciﬁcation and would then immediately know the idea embodied in it.
However, the empirical observations suggest that the information that accrues as a
by-product of research and development is, by itself, not suﬃcient for the transfer
of knowledge between generations. Moreover, large parts of an economy’s productive
knowledge are not patented or embodied in a product directly sold at the market, such
as for instance many process innovations. This gives rise to the observed purposeful
and costly knowledge codiﬁcation.
As the discourse on knowledge codiﬁcation has been almost entirely on a verbal basis
(see e.g. Dasgupta and David (1994) and Cowan et al. (2000)), this paper develops a
formal model of endogenous growth that incorporates costly knowledge codiﬁcation as
a means of intergenerational knowledge transfer. We use a standard two-sector over-
lapping generations framework of endogenous growth in which the knowledge transfer
between generations of employees in a long-lived intermediate ﬁrm is imperfect. By
investing in knowledge codiﬁcation this transfer can be improved. It is assumed that
the capital owners, that is, the members of the old generation are the ﬁrm owners and
the intermediate ﬁrm is managed on their behalf. The young generation will take over
the ownership claims at the end of the period and may then be willing to compensate
the retiring researchers for knowledge codiﬁcation. In this way, the codiﬁcation deci-
sion can be depicted as part of the general savings decision of the young generations’
utility maximization problem. This decision process drives the main results.
We ﬁnd that although knowledge codiﬁcation positively inﬂuences an economy’s long-
run growth rate of output, there will initially be no knowledge codiﬁcation in an econ-
omy that develops from a small level of capital. We thus examine under which con-
ditions an economy will codify in the long run. As a main result, we show that this
will be the case if the steady-state growth rate of capital is higher than that of the
of the code available, on the other, it depends on the idea itself. Highly abstract mathematical ideas
seem to allow better codiﬁcation than the idea “how to ride a bicycle”.
5knowledge stock. When both steady-state growth rates are equal, it is suﬃcient for
long-run knowledge codiﬁcation if the steady-state level of the intensive capital stock
is large enough. The intuition is that under the given conditions the marginal prod-
uct of another piece of knowledge preserved by knowledge codiﬁcation becomes large
enough such that the ﬁrm owners are willing to bear the costs of codiﬁcation. By a
similar reasoning we extend the analysis to include decreasing codiﬁcation costs and
ﬁxed set-up costs of knowledge codiﬁcation.
The focus on intergenerational knowledge transfer by costly knowledge codiﬁcation has
not yet been taken up by formal models of economic growth although the knowledge
management literature suggests that this is an important problem.
A recent paper of Thoenig and Verdier (2004) is also concerned with the macroeconomic
aspects of knowledge management. However, instead of focussing on the incentive to
preserve knowledge in intergenerational knowledge transfer, they emphasize the trade-
oﬀ that by knowledge codiﬁcation contractual incompleteness between the ﬁrm owner
and the employee can be avoided, which, however, implies the risk of information
spillovers to competitors.
Further, the paper is related to the literature on technology adoption models and the
literature on endogenous spillovers by own research. It possesses the same underlying
motivation, in that blueprints deﬁned as the ”by-product” description of a technology
are incomplete in conveying what is useful to know about the technology at hand. It
needs additional human capital to fully understand and work the blueprints.5 The fo-
cus of building up this human capital in order to apply a new technology for production
is discussed in the adoption models. The present work is more related to the models
which focus on the human capital necessary to understand the idea embodied in the
blueprint (possibly the patent speciﬁcation) in order to imitate the technology or use
the idea for further research. This kind of human capital is commonly referred to as
‘absorptive capacity’ which is built up by own research.6 The corresponding strand of
the literature usually examines endogenous knowledge spillovers between competitors
in a certain market. In such an environment the innovator of a new product is inter-
ested in conveying as little information as possible to the competitors. That is, the
patent speciﬁcation or other codiﬁed sources of the idea will only include the absolutely
necessary descriptions. The focus in the present work is on knowledge transfer between
generations of employees within a ﬁrm. In such a setting, there may be an incentive
for further knowledge codiﬁcation in order to reduce the ”adoption costs” in terms of
own research by the newly hired employees.
The proposed formal model corresponds to the standard idea-driven growth models
as in Romer (1990),7 Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Grossman and Helpman (1991).
What sets it apart is that it explicitly models a human capital stock and a stock of
5This terminology was taken from Jovanovic (1997).
6See Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Griﬃth et al. (2003) built a model that incorporates ‘absorptive
capacity’ into a model of economic growth.
7This will be discussed in the third part of the paper.
6codiﬁed ideas. Ideas can only be used productively if they are learned and, hence,
are part of the employee’s (intellectual) human capital. The latter can be enhanced
by utilizing codiﬁed ideas if previous generations have codiﬁed them. In this way, the
model could be considered as what is sometimes called a hybrid version8 between the
idea driven growth models and the human capital accumulation growth models with
the peculiarity of endogenous knowledge spillovers between generations by knowledge
codiﬁcation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and describes
its general dynamics. The remainder of the paper concentrates on the analysis of the
economy’s long run codiﬁcation behavior. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an overlapping generations economy similar to the well-known Diamond
(1965) model, in which agents live for two periods. Time is inﬁnite in the forward
direction and divided into discrete periods indexed by t. There is a continuum of indi-
viduals Pt on [0,1] =: Pt in each generation. There is no population growth and the size
of each generation is normalized to 1. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit
of labor when young and consumes its capital savings plus the capital rent when old.
Hence, total labor supply in each period t is given by Lt = 1. The economy features two
sectors. An intermediate goods sector that creates intermediate goods from physical
capital and knowledge and a production sector that uses the intermediate product and
labor to generate a homogenous physical good that can be used for consumption and
investment. The diﬀerence to the usual models of endogenous growth is that within
the intermediate sector, the individuals can inﬂuence the return on capital by investing
in knowledge codiﬁcation.
2.1 Knowledge and Information
Let there be an inﬁnite set of ideas and assign each idea an index i ∈ I. Every idea
that becomes economically viable is initially embodied in its inventor and – at a cost
– may be expressed as information. As this paper focusses on intergenerational knowl-
edge transfer, the following will refer to information as the purposefully created local
public good mentioned in the introduction. Generally, there are two ways to transmit
knowledge between generations. One is face-to-face interaction between a teacher or
mentor and his scholar9. The other is knowledge codiﬁcation by the one generation
and attending to this information by a later generation, for example, by writing and
reading a book. We will take both kinds of transfer as substitutes.10. We say a person
8See for example Klenow (1998).
9This is the focus of the article by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995)
10This does not preclude the existence of an idea’s tacit counterpart that cannot be conveyed via
code, as is often claimed in the literature on the tacitness and codiﬁability of knowledge. See e.g.
7born at time t, Pt ∈ Pt knows an idea i, if she is able to attach meaning to it. Or
synonymously, if ”i is embodied in Pt”. Hence, person Pt’s knowledge or human capital
is deﬁned as TPt = {i ∈ I | i is embodied in Pt}. The stock of information is the index
set of the codiﬁed ideas Ct = {i ∈ I | i is codiﬁed}. For illustrative purposes, imagine
a bookshelf with each book containing exactly one idea. The book’s title is i indicating
the idea it contains. Knowing a person’s human capital, one could immediately tell
which books this person can understand, that is, {i ∈ TPt ∩ Ct} and which ones she
would encounter diﬃculties with ({I \ TPt ∩ Ct}).
To operationalize this concept of knowledge, we represent the knowledge stock as an
interval in IR. That is, we specify I = IR+. Further, we order the ideas according to
their diﬃculty. More precisely, if i < j then idea i is easier to comprehend or more
basic than idea j. For example, addition is less diﬃcult than solving diﬀerential equa-
tions. Recalling the bookshelf example, this would mean that the books are ordered,
e.g. from left to right, starting with the ones containing the rather basic ideas and
becoming successively more diﬃcult. They are indexed continuously beginning at 0.
We are deﬁning a person’s measure of human capital by the index of the most diﬃcult
idea she is able to understand. More precisely, τPt = supTPt. The central assumption
of the ordering concept is:
Assumption (A1) If i is embodied in person Pt, then j < i is also embodied in
person Pt.
As we deﬁned I = IR+, τPt would be the Lebesgue-measure of TPt. The deﬁnitions
imply that an individual with human capital of 5 possesses the set of tacit components
[0,5] and, thus, comprehends the contents of all information indexed by i ∈ [0,5], re-
spectively is able to use ideas i ∈ [0,5] in production.11
Let Ct := supCt represent the economy’s stock of information. The ordering concept
may involve:
Assumption (A2) Before an idea indexed by i can be codiﬁed, all ideas with index
j, j < i must have been codiﬁed. This implies that if i is codiﬁed in period t, then j < i
is also codiﬁed in t.
With assumption (A2), Ct is identical to the Lebesgue-measure of Ct.
2.2 The Production Sector
Final-goods production is characterized by a continuum (on [0,1]) of identical ﬁrms
which produce the homogenous good with the use of labor LA,t and the intermediate
good xt as inputs. Since ﬁnal-goods ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts and own no assets, they
Collins (1974), David (1998)
11Note that other ordering concepts, for example a chronological order, would work just as well as
long as (A1) holds.
8can be ignored in the speciﬁcation of endowments.12 The ﬁrms maximize proﬁts and
act competitively in the product and factor markets. For better tractability, the most
convenient way to model ﬁnal production is by means of a representative ﬁrm whose
production and factor demands represent aggregate values. The aggregate production












t = F(xt,LA,t) − px,txt − wA,tLA,t.
As it is a constant-returns-to-scale ﬁrm, its input demands are deﬁned only after the
scale of operation is pinned down. However, the demand for labor and intermediate
goods is characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions. Labor and the intermediate goods


















2.3 The Intermediate Goods Sector
In general, the intermediate sector is assumed to consist of long-lived intermediate ﬁrms
whose ownership is handed down from one generation to the next. More precisely, the
capital stock is sold publicly at the end of a period t to the next period’s old generation.
This process could be interpreted as secondary public oﬀering. Further, the young
generation of t may additionally increase the capital stock of t+1 by saving more than
the amount of capital left from the previous generation. Physical capital left at the
disposal of the intermediate ﬁrm is interpreted as ownership claims. As mentioned in
the introduction, we assume that the ﬁrm owners collectively decide on the values of
the control variables of the intermediate ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem. In order
to depict the mechanics of the model as easy as possible, in this model the intermediate
goods sector is characterized by a single intermediate ﬁrm.14
2.3.1 The Decision Process
The economic problem with respect to the transfer of knowledge by knowledge cod-
iﬁcation between two succeeding generations of employees can be translated into the
12For illustrative purposes one could assume that the ﬁnal-goods ﬁrms are managed and owned by
the members of the young generation.
13According to Sargent (1979), the preceding assumptions guarantee the existence of such a repre-
sentative ﬁnal-product ﬁrm.
14The model can also be extended to include oligopolistic intermediate sectors. See Schneider (2007).
9overlapping generations framework by the following three stage game:
Stage 1: At the end of period t, the new capital owners may invest in knowledge
codiﬁcation before the employees of the intermediate ﬁrm, the researchers,
retire.15
Stage 2: At the beginning of t+1, the newly hired researchers are asked to compen-
sate the ﬁrm owners for their codiﬁcation investment. (Under the assump-
tion that the knowledge database or library is excludable16.)
Stage 3: The capital owners decide on giving access to the ﬁrm’s information stock.
We assume that allowing access to the knowledge database does not incur costs. It is
clear that no newly hired researcher would make a compensatory payment independent
of the decisions of her colleagues, as she knows that the capital owners will provide the
information for free. By backward induction, the ﬁrm owners, knowing that they bear
the full codiﬁcation costs, will only invest in knowledge codiﬁcation up to the proﬁt-
maximizing amount. This may imply a hold-up problem in case knowledge codiﬁcation
positively inﬂuences the next period’s wage level.17
One may ask whether the investment problem within the ﬁrm is well depicted by this
game structure. For example, why do the ﬁrm owners give away the information for
free, although they know that the new employees might beneﬁt from it by higher wages?
The argument is that as long as the ﬁrm owners can only ask for a compensatory
payment, the new employees will always deny. Suppose the game were extended to
more than three stages, in which after the third stage the new employees are asked for
a compensatory payment and the ﬁrm owners decide on giving access to the information
stock in an alternating sequence. With ﬁnitely many stages, there must be a last stage
before the production of the intermediate goods has to start. At the last but one stage,
the new employees know that if they again deny a compensatory payment, the ﬁrm
owners would give access to the information for free at the last stage, as otherwise
they would forgo a certain amount of proﬁts. Further, a threat by the ﬁrm owners to
destroy the information would be empty because they would forgo additional proﬁts.
In this way, proﬁt maximization of the ﬁrm owners proceeds in two stages:
Stage 1: At the end of period t, the ﬁrm owners collectively decide on how much to
invest in knowledge codiﬁcation before the researchers retire.
15Note that within the overlapping generations structure, the next period’s researchers are not born,
yet.
16With respect to excludability, two speciﬁcations would be possible. On the one hand, a codiﬁed
idea could be a public good with respect to the new researchers as soon as the the ﬁrm owners
give access to it. On the other hand each employee could be given exclusive access to certain ideas
dependent on her compensatory payment. These speciﬁcations have not been explicitly distinguished
as it does not change the outcome of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
17For a detailed discussion on the hold-up problem with respect to knowledge codiﬁcation see
Schneider (2007).
10Stage 2: At the beginning of t+1, given the amount of ideas that have been codiﬁed,
the capital owners decide on the amount of intermediate goods to produce
and on how many new researchers to hire.
Of course by backward induction, the second stage maximization problem of t + 1 is
solved given a certain stock of information and then the optimal codiﬁcation decision
is taken. The collective decision process with respect to knowledge codiﬁcation takes
the following form:
. Every individual capital owner can propose an amount ζt,prop to spend on knowl-
edge codiﬁcation. The costs are split up among the individuals according to their
capital shares.
. Each shareholder votes for or against the proposal and the amount is approved
according to the unanimity rule.
. If the proposal has been accepted, the amount is collected and the retiring re-
searchers are paid to codify their ideas.
For simplicity we assume that this decision process does not incur transaction costs.
It would also be possible to assume that a manager acts on behalf of the capital owners.
It is clear that given the capital and information stock in period t+1, the second stage
maximization problem is a static proﬁt optimization within the period. However, the
codiﬁcation decision at the ﬁrst stage cannot be made independent of the households’
preferences concerning the distribution of consumption between periods. Hence, the
second stage problem will be solved at the end of this section and the decision on knowl-
edge codiﬁcation will be elaborated further within the households’ utility maximization
problem.
2.3.2 Research and Intermediate Goods Production
The intermediate good can be produced according to the following production func-
tion: xt = G(Kt,τt) = Ktτt.18 Kt denotes the measure of the capital stock at time
t. The knowledge stock of the intermediate ﬁrm which corresponds to the knowledge
stock of the economy in period t, τt, is deﬁned by the index of the most diﬃcult idea
in the union of all sets of tacit components τt = sup∪Pt∈PtTPt. It equals the highest
18Note that this speciﬁcation implies that a technological improvement increases production of the
ﬁnal product in the same way as an increase in the stock of capital, which is usually referred to
as Solow-neutral technological progress. The innovation process could be regarded as both, process
or product innovation. The interpretation of the ﬁrst would be that the higher knowledge stock
allows for the production of more homogenous intermediate goods with a certain capital input. On
the other hand, one could argue that the capital stock is transformed into higher quality intermediate
products, which possess a productivity in ﬁnal-goods production identical to xt units of some standard
intermediate good.
11measure of human capital in the set Pt at time t.
Human capital of a person Pt ∈ Pt may originate from three sources:19
τPt = qτt−1 + β max{0,Ct − qτt−1} + ε(qτt−1)
Φ.
First, every individual is exogenously transferred a share q of the economy’s knowledge
stock of the previous period, e.g. in school or by other educative means.20 This transfer
is imperfect, q ∈ (0,1).
As a second source, the members of the new generation who are becoming researchers
in the intermediate ﬁrm can enhance their human capital by attending to codiﬁed
ideas if previous generations of researchers have codiﬁed their knowledge. Recall the
bookshelf example: If the highest index of the books in the shelf Ct is greater than
the highest index of the ideas the young generation of t has already learned, qτt−1,
they are interested in reading the books indexed by (qτt−1,Ct]. In each period the
new generation is able to build up additional human capital of a fraction β ∈ (0,1)
of those codiﬁed ideas.21 As (A2) is a strong requirement, most part of the analysis
will consider situations without (A2). Then, the following assumption with regard to
knowledge codiﬁcation holds instead.
Assumption (A2’) In a period t and for all i,j ≥ qτt: Before an idea indexed by i
is codiﬁed, all ideas with index j, j < i have been codiﬁed already. This implies that if
i is codiﬁed in period t, then j < i is also codiﬁed in t.
Finally, a person Pt deciding to do research is able to generate a number ε(qτt−1)Φ
of new ideas. The term “new ideas” is supposed to reﬂect the subjective perspective
of person Pt. That is, the ideas generated are new to Pt, but not necessarily to all
other persons. We examine the case of Φ = 1, which means that researchers are be-
coming more productive with an increasing stock of knowledge to draw upon. This
corresponds to the usual ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ argument of endogenous
growth models.
The process of knowledge acquisition shows a sequential nature, proceeding from
schooling via reading to own research. For analytical simplicity, the ﬁrst two kinds
of knowledge transmission happen at no time at the beginning of each period. Re-
search and development, however, takes time, such that a person has to decide as to
whether she is going to work in ﬁnal-goods production or to do research. Let LR,t
denote the number of persons who are hired to do research in period t and let them be
arranged on the continuum from 0 to LR,t. Since they have been transferred the same
amount of human capital from the old generation and generate the same number of
new ideas each, they all possess the same level of knowledge. More precisely, τP1
t = τP2
t ,
19The dynamics of the knowledge stock have also been inspired by a working paper on technological
regress by Aiyar and Dalgaard (2002).
20It could also be interpreted as imperfect human capital transfer within the intermediate ﬁrm.
21β reﬂects how easy ideas can be acquired from reading.
12∀P 1
t ,P 2
t ∈ [0,LR,t].22 Further we assume spillover-eﬀects occur within research groups
which are deﬁned as Gt ⊆ [0,LR,t]. Let LGt be the Lebesgue-measure of Gt, representing
the number of researchers in research group Gt.23 Research groups may be employed by
the intermediate ﬁrm which can be interpreted as a single research joint venture owned
by the old generation. Hence, having only one research group of size LR,t implies that
τPt = τR,t, ∀Pt ∈ [0,LR,t], where
τR,t = qτt−1 + β max{0,Ct − qτt−1} + εqτt−1LR,t.
Accordingly, the economy’s knowledge stock is determined by τt = τR,t. It is the max-
imum level of knowledge that can be productively employed at time t. The dynamics
of the economy’s knowledge stock can then be written as follows24
τt =

qτt−1 + β(Ct − qτt−1) + εqτt−1LR,t, Ct > qτt−1;
qτt−1 + εqτt−1LR,t , Ct ≤ qτt−1.
2.3.3 Second Stage Proﬁt Maximization
Within period t, the intermediate ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts by deciding on the intermedi-






t = px,t(xt)xt − wR,tLR,t.
Taking the information stock and physical capital as given, the problem is one-dimensional
in LR,t. Using the demand for intermediate products of the ﬁnal-goods ﬁrms, the nec-










In this way, the supply of intermediate goods, xs
t, and the factor demand for researchers,
Ld




























(qτt−1 + β max{0,Ct − qτt−1}).
22Analogously, the symmetry of the knowledge level applies to the workers.
23Of course, this deﬁnition involves a measure theoretic problem. Since single points on the interval
[0,LR,t] possess measure 0, there exist research groups Gt consisting of more than one person with
measure 0. We preclude such groups by assumption.
24The assumption of only one research group in the economy is not necessary to obtain this diﬀerence
equation. However, all research groups of the economy must be of equal size.
25The suﬃcient condition for a maximum is satisﬁed due to the strict concavity of the objective





























For reasons of clarity in exposition, Ld
R,t was not inserted into the proﬁt function. The
proﬁts are allocated among the shareholders of the intermediate ﬁrm proportional to













2.4 The Costs of Knowledge Codiﬁcation
Knowledge codiﬁcation takes time and physical resources as carriers of information such
as paper, CD-ROMs or hard disks. There is also a need for reproduction and storage
devices. Additionally knowledge databases have to be maintained and administrated.
Costs could even include the creation of new codes, e.g. if the existing one does not
suﬃce for expression. Although the notion ‘knowledge codiﬁcation’ may also comprise
the creation of all kinds of artifacts, for illustrative purposes, it will be referred to as
the creation of information via some natural language.26 For simplicity, We assume
that every idea can be codiﬁed at the same cost of γt units of the homogenous good
within period t. The codiﬁcation costs per idea γt may change over time, hence the
index t in the cost function. However, the marginal costs are supposed to be constant
within each period. In this way, the cost function shows a linear form within periods:
Γt(4Ct) = γt4Ct.
Additionally ﬁxed entry costs f may accrue once in the ﬁrst period of knowledge codiﬁ-
cation for setting up computer systems, establishing management structures or building
archives or libraries.27
Three implicit assumptions with respect to the cost function are that, ﬁrst, the costs
of knowledge codiﬁcation per idea do not depend on the number of new employees to
access the information in the next period. According to the deﬁnition of information,
it may well be that an increasing number of researchers may necessitate further costly
copying and distribution activities. However, it is assumed that the cost share of these
activities due to variations in the number of new researchers between periods is negli-
gible.
Second, if the new capital owners decided on a positive codiﬁcation level, those to
actually codify the ideas are the researchers of that period as they possess the highest
level of knowledge. However, would they codify at the marginal costs γt? The rea-
soning is in the Bertrand-fashion: As long as there is more than one researcher, they
26For illustrative purposes, one could think of writing a book for the previously described bookshelf.
27It will explicitly be mentioned in the analysis when entry costs are considered.
14will agree to codify at the marginal costs because they are symmetric with respect to
knowledge. The situation with only one researcher is mathematically precluded by the
representation of the population on the interval [0,1], because positive research implies
a research group of measure greater than zero. For a more general interpretation, it is
assumed that when having only one researcher, the ﬁrm owners oﬀer a forcing contract
that contains a compensation for knowledge codiﬁcation slightly above the marginal
costs. The researcher will accept the contract. This is the case as the ﬁrm owners
know that the researcher will be better oﬀ if she codiﬁed at slightly above the marginal
costs and hence has no incentive to revise the conditions of the contract, even if the
researcher would neglect the contract at ﬁrst.28
Third, for simplicity it is assumed that information once created cannot be retrans-
formed into the homogeneous consumption good.
2.5 The Problem of the Household
Each individual lives for two periods and maximizes the discounted sum of utilities.
There is a constant discount factor δ > 0.29 The individuals inelastically supply one
unit of labor when young and may choose as to whether they want to work in ﬁnal-
goods production or in research and development. The budget constraint when young
is given by the wage wt that can be split into consumption today c1,t, saving wtst in
physical capital and investment in knowledge codiﬁcation wtςt. The physical capital
savings plus the real return on capital rt+1 equal consumption when old c2,t+1
30. The
household privately saves in physical capital which is interpreted as ownership claims
on the intermediate ﬁrm and then takes part in a collective decision within the ﬁrm on
knowledge codiﬁcation. The problem of the household can be depicted by the following
three stage process.
Stage 1: The household decides on how much it would like to save in physical capital
and how much to propose for investment in knowledge codiﬁcation.
Stage 2: The collective decision with respect to knowledge codiﬁcation within the
intermediate ﬁrm is taken.
Stage 3: The household may adjust capital savings given the investment in knowledge
codiﬁcation.
It is assumed that the households cannot commit to or be constrained to a certain
amount of physical capital saving. In particular, at the third stage, the individual can
revise her decision after the amount of knowledge codiﬁcation has been set. In this way,
28It depends on the number of the stages of the game how often the researcher may neglect the
contract. However, she will accept it at the last stage.
29This implies a constant rate of time preference ρ > −1.
30The index indicates whether the person is young (1) or old (2) in period t.
15each young individual makes a decentral decision over her capital savings.31 As the
model is entirely deterministic, the individuals know that they are all symmetric with
respect to wage and preferences. Accordingly, at the ﬁrst stage, she decides whether
she would like to make a proposal on the codiﬁcation investment by solving
max
st,ςt
Ut(c1,t,c2,t+1) = u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1)
subject to
c1,t = wt(1 − st − ςt),
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)stwt.
For notational convenience, let St := stwt and ζt := ςtwt, where st,ςt ∈ [0,1]. The
individual’s proposal on the intermediate ﬁrm’s codiﬁcation investment would then be
ζt,prop =
R 1



































As information cannot be transformed into the consumption good, a negative codiﬁ-
cation investment suggestion is not possible. Hence, an agent will make a suggestion
if her optimal level ζt,prop is greater than zero. In particular, if no proposal has been
put forth or no proposal has been accepted, the optimization problem is equivalent to
31This is plausible because although by coordination the households could choose the monopoly cap-
ital stock, each individual has an incentive to deviate by increasing her saving rate. The coordination
in the codiﬁcation case is possible as by assumption they have to pay the codiﬁcation costs immedi-
ately and hence cannot deviate to lower codiﬁcation. Of course, every household could privately pay
for additional knowledge codiﬁcation, but none has an incentive to do so.
32Appendix A veriﬁes that there is a unique solution of the necessary conditions which implies a
maximum of the objective function.
16the regular maximization problem in an overlapping generation model with production.
Since all individuals are ﬂexible to choose their profession, the model features only one
labor market, and wages of the diﬀerent occupations must be equal in equilibrium. As
a consequence, each household faces an identical optimization problem, such that in
fact each person makes the same proposal on knowledge codiﬁcation expenses which, of
course, will be accepted. It is thus convenient to work with a representative household
as being the young generation characterized by its date of birth t.33 Each generation
faces the ﬁrst stage optimization problem and its solution is interpreted as aggregate
savings St and investment in knowledge codiﬁcation ζt ≥ 0.
2.6 Sequence of Events
This section summarizes the time-line of the model’s typical events in a regular period
t:
(1) At the beginning of period t, the members of the new generation are exogenously
transferred a share q of the economy’s knowledge stock of the previous period:
τPt = qτt−1, Pt ∈ Pt.
(2) The intermediate ﬁrm hires a number LR,t of researchers. If the researchers of
the previous periods have codiﬁed their ideas, the new generation of researchers
in t would additionally build up human capital of β(Ct − qτt−1).
(3) The intermediate ﬁrm produces intermediate good xt with the capital saved by
the now old generation Pt−1 and the researchers’ human capital. The researchers
receive wage wR,t. The proﬁts πint
t are split among the capital owners.
(4) The ﬁnal-product ﬁrm rents the intermediate products at price px,t and hires a
number LA,t of workers at a wage wA,t in order to produce the ﬁnal good Yt.
(5) At the end of period t, the young generation decides how much of the wage income
to consume c1,t and how much to transfer to the next period. On the one hand,
the young generation (decentrally) saves in physical capital, which ensures own-
ership rights of the intermediate ﬁrm in t+1 involving a return rt+1. On the other
hand, it may invest in knowledge codiﬁcation which is the result of a collective
decision made at the shareholder’s meeting of the intermediate ﬁrm. Knowledge
codiﬁcation increases the knowledge stock of t+1 and consequently the rent rt+1.
(6) Dependent on the investment in knowledge codiﬁcation, ζt, the researchers of
period t codify an amount 4Ct of their ideas.
33In fact, individuals belonging to the same generations may be heterogenous with respect to human
capital. Earning the same wage, this heterogeneity does not carry over to the households’ utility
maximization problem.
17(7) The old generation sells its capital to the young, consumes its receipts Kt plus
the return on capital rtKt = πint
t , and then dies.
As usually assumed in overlapping generations models, there is one physical good that
can be consumed. Output that is not consumed can be used as capital in the following
period. The literature suggests two ways of interpretation with respect to the capital
stock. In both, savings of the young generation in t equal the capital stock of period
t + 1. In the ﬁrst, the young generation buys the current capital stock from the old
with their savings and “net-saves” the diﬀerence St − Kt, which becomes the net in-
crease in capital of the subsequent period. The second approach assumes that capital is
”eatable” or consumable, such that the old generation consumes its capital at the end
of its life. In this way, the capital stock of the next period is always identical to con-
sumption forgone of the previous period, which has become productive with a time lag.
Both interpretations could apply to our model, however, suggesting a long-lasting in-
termediate ﬁrm, we will go with the ﬁrst.34 In detail, we assume that the intermediate
ﬁrm transforms the capital stock to the intermediate good, which is rent to ﬁnal-goods
production. Over one period the intermediate good depreciates in the sense that it
cannot be used in ﬁnal production unless it is overhauled. But it can still be used as
raw capital in the next period.35
2.7 Sequential Markets Equilibrium
The economy comprises three markets: the labor market, the market for intermediate
products and the market for the consumption good. The following analysis will focus
on the sequential markets equilibrium, which is deﬁned by the three markets to clear
in each period.
Deﬁnition 1 Given K1,τ0 > 0, C1 ≥ 0, and St = Kt+1, Ct+1 = f(Ct,ζt), a sequen-




(i) they solve the utility maximization problem of the households and the proﬁt max-
imization problems of the end-product ﬁrms and of the intermediate ﬁrm for all
t ≥ 1 and
(ii) in every period the economy is in temporary equilibrium, that is, for all t ≥ 1:
34Adopting the ﬁrst interpretation and assuming that capital is not consumable may be problematic
for ﬁnite time horizons and if the capital stock is decreasing. Both problems will not occur in this
paper.
35It is well known that overlapping generations economies may exhibit equilibria with asset bubbles.















(c) (Final Goods Market)
Y
s
t = c1,t + c2,t + St + ζt.
As the supply and demand functions are derived by the respective optimization prob-
lems, it is clear that the model satisﬁes (i). Further, the properties of the ﬁnal-goods-
production function imply that the temporary equilibrium of the labor market will
exhibit a positive share of workers in this sector due to the Inada conditions. Using
the respective demand functions from the ﬁrst order conditions of the representative































R,t, we receive the equilibrium wage









Note that as ∂τt
∂LR,t = εqτt−1, the wage is independent of the amount of knowledge
codiﬁcation of the previous period. In this way, the model characterized by a speciﬁca-
tion of the production of intermediate goods with Solow-neutral technological progress
does not exhibit a hold-up problem with respect to knowledge codiﬁcation. However,
knowledge codiﬁcation may possess positive externalities to the wage levels from the
next but one period on.
Inserting the equilibrium wage into the labor demand functions and using Ls
t = 1 gives
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19The corner solution (LA,t,LR,t) = (1,0)36 would involve a successively decreasing knowl-
edge stock because the ideas of the previous period cannot be recovered fully by direct
transfer and knowledge codiﬁcation. As shown in appendix B, the economy’s equi-





q + β(1 − q)
qε
. (2)
Otherwise, the economy would stay in a low level trap with a declining knowledge
stock and declining output as a consequence. Without explicit mention otherwise, we
assume that (2) holds.
As utility is non-saturated in consumption, one of the market clearing conditions is re-
dundant by Walras law. We leave aside the consumption goods market and concentrate



















Hence, for all wt > 0 there will be a positive price px,t that solves the intermediate











Let the homogeneous good be the num´ eraire. The sequential market equilibrium is



















This section introduces the general dynamics of the model, which are described by the
diﬀerence equations of the economy’s three stocks: capital, knowledge and information.
The development of the capital stock is determined by each period’s saving decision,
Kt+1 = stwt. Using the equilibrium wage it transforms into
Kt+1 = stK
α





















36Note that there is no other corner solution due to the Inada-conditions for ﬁnal goods production
and a positive value of the knowledge stock in the ﬁrst period τ1.
20The behavior of the knowledge stock, given the equilibrium number of researchers, can
be written as
τt+1 = ν(qτt(1 + ε) + β(max{0,Ct+1 − qτt})),
where ν = α2
α2+1−α. From this equation, we obtain the growth rate of knowledge as




Finally the stock of information accumulates according to
Ct+1 = Ct + 4Ct , 4Ct ≥ 0.
In the two extreme cases in which the researchers are not codifying at all (indexed by
”woC”) and the one in which they are codifying every new idea in each period (”wC”),
the maximum term in the knowledge stock’s diﬀerence equation will be zero in the ﬁrst
case and we can set Ct = τt−1 in the latter. This gives
g
woC
τ,t = νq(1 + ε) − 1,
g
wC
τ,t = ν(q(1 + ε) + β(1 − q)) − 1.
As we preclude negative codiﬁcation and codiﬁcation of ideas that have not yet been
discovered, gτ,t ∈ [gwoC
τ ,gwC
τ ], ∀t.
The common standing on the shoulders of giants speciﬁcation of the research process
implies long run growth. As shown in appendix D, the economy possesses two kinds
of steady states distinguished by whether the economy exhibits positive or zero codiﬁ-
cation. Moreover, an economy with zero codiﬁcation will approach growth at constant
rates in the long run. Every steady state exhibits the same relation of the growth rates





With regard to output, we can write











Log-diﬀerentiating and using (4) veriﬁes that the steady-state growth rate of output
equals that of capital




The dynamics show that with knowledge codiﬁcation, the economy would reach a higher
steady-state growth rate of output. The magnitude crucially depends on the transfer
rate q and the reading capacity β. Hence, knowledge codiﬁcation may account for a
large proportion of an economy’s growth rate if other knowledge transfer capabilities
are bad. When bearing no cost, the researchers would always codify their knowledge
to the full extent at the end of the period.
213 Codiﬁcation Behavior of the Economy
This is the main section of the paper, in which we examine under what conditions an
economy will realize the higher growth rates of output with knowledge codiﬁcation.
For this purpose, it will ﬁrst be necessary to revisit the household problem before es-
tablishing three lemmata which unfold the structure of the problem. Thereafter, we
will present the results.
Recall the representative agent’s utility-maximization problem as introduced in section
2.5. The new ﬁrm owners may have an incentive to invest in knowledge codiﬁcation in
the amount of ζt. Since one cannot codify something that is not known, and precluding
double codiﬁcation, 4Ct ∈ [0,τt − Ct−1]. With γt being constant within periods and
St = Kt+1, the household’s utility maximization problem can equivalently be solved
via the control variables Kt+1,4Ct. For convenience, we will use this notation in the
following.
The usual procedure is to calculate the derivative of the rent with respect to the amount
of codiﬁcation in t and solve the ﬁrst order condition for 4Ct. This is what we are
going to do, however,
drt+1
d4Ct exhibits a discontinuity which necessitates some preliminary
considerations.
Recall the diﬀerence equation of knowledge given that the economy will be in temporary
equilibrium in each period:
τt+1 = νqτt(1 + ε) + νβ(max{0,Ct+1 − qτt}). (5)
The maximum term indicates that the codiﬁcation of one more idea in t contributes
to the knowledge stock in t + 1 only if the young generation in t + 1 has not been
transferred the respective human capital. That is, codiﬁcation in t of ideas that the
young generation of t+1 will know without reading the information (because they will
have learned it in school), possesses no value in t + 1. Therefore, codiﬁcation of an
additional idea given the information stock Ct - this idea would be indexed by Ct + η,





νβ , if Ct ≥ qτt;
0 , if Ct < qτt.
Accordingly, we can distinguish the ideas to be codiﬁed in t by their marginal value in
the subsequent period t + 1. We denote the number of ideas that are of zero marginal
value by 4Cie,t ∈ [0,max{qτt − Ct,0}] and those with positive marginal value by
4Ce,t ∈ [0,max{0,min{τt(1−q),τt−Ct}}]. It follows that Ct+1 = Ct+4Cie,t+4Ce,t.
Consequently, we can rewrite (5) as
τt+1 = νqτt(1 + ε) + νβ(4Ce,t + max{0,Ct − qτt}). (6)
The middle term expresses that the young generation can build up knowledge from
reading information codiﬁed in the last period 4Ce,t and, in case it has been trans-
ferred a measure of human capital less than what has already been codiﬁed in the
22periods before t, it can additionally attend to ”the older books” labelled by indices
i ∈ [qτt,Ct]. The latter would imply that all additionally generated information in t
is of positive value in the next period, that is, 4Ct = 4Ce,t. On the other hand, if
Ct < qτt, 4Cie,t is positive. This implies that the representative agent may also have
to pay for information that will not generate any beneﬁt in the next period. Hence, the
codiﬁcation decision of the young generation is aﬀected by assumption (A2). It may
involve an additional ’entry cost’ for knowledge codiﬁcation. Without (A2), the repre-
sentative agent could codify ideas with positive marginal value in the next period only.
In this case, Ct cannot be interpreted as the measure of the stock of information. It is
just the highest index of all codiﬁed ideas. However, with assumption (A2’) the term
Ct+1 − qτt is well deﬁned as the (Lebesque)-measure of eﬃcient information. Hence,
the dynamics of the knowledge stock are also well deﬁned with (A2’) instead of (A2).
Rather than asking how many ideas in total, that is 4Ct, the young of t will codify,
the discontinuity can be eliminated by reformulating the question to: How many ideas
of positive marginal value 4Ce,t is the young generation willing to codify in period
t, given the stock of information Ct, that is, given that it may have to codify some
ideas of zero marginal value in t + 1. This structurally corresponds to the household’s
situation with (A2’) and ﬁxed entry costs f. Altogether, the ﬁrst order conditions of










Inserting optimal saving into the necessary condition with regard to codiﬁcation then
yields




This equation gives all pairs (Kt+1,4Ce,t) that are candidates of the solution to
the household’s maximization problem. Or, in other words, it deﬁnes a function
4Ce,t(Kt+1)38, that determines the optimal choice of 4Ce,t for each optimal Kt+1.
As we preclude negative codiﬁcation, the solution to the household’s problem must
be a point on the graph of this function or involve the corner solution 4Ce,t = 0.
37Using ζt = γt4Ct and St = Kt+1, the household’s problem can be transformed to
max
Kt+1,4Ce,t
Ut(c1,t,c2,t+1) = u(c1,t) + δu(c2,t+1),
subject to c1,t = wt − Kt+1 − γt4Ct,
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)Kt+1.
38Using the implicit function theorem, let M(Kt+1,4Ce,t) =
∂rt+1








∂4Ce,t < 0, ∀Kt+1 ≥ 0.
23Equation (7) illuminates very nicely the household’s tradeoﬀ between saving, that is
capital investment, and knowledge codiﬁcation. On the left hand side is the amount
of consumption the young would receive when old, if they used the marginal codiﬁ-
cation costs for saving, which in optimum must be equal to the marginal beneﬁts of
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Calculating the derivative of rt+1 with respect to 4Ce,t, inserting it into the marginal
condition (7) and using the diﬀerence equation of the knowledge stock as in (6), we
























− max{0,Ct − qτt}. (9)
Note that these marginal considerations imply that ”entry costs” are sunk, in the sense
that they have to be paid in any case, or there are no ﬁxed costs for codiﬁcation. With
assumption (A2), this may be because the previous generation has created enough in-
formation such that 4Cie,t = 0. Of course, without entry costs for codiﬁcation, the
young’s willingness to codify as reﬂected in equation (9) is optimal. With (A2) or (A2’)
and f > 0, it is necessary to verify that the representative agent’s life-time utility with
codiﬁcation, given entry costs (γt4Cie,t and/or f) is higher than her utility when only
investing in capital and hence not incurring ﬁxed costs. Assumption (A2) certainly
represents an extreme, possibly rather hypothetical case where all previously invented
ideas have to be codiﬁed before being able to codify an idea i. The reasoning behind it
may be that if new ideas draw upon previous ideas, the codiﬁcation of the ﬁrst would
have to refer to the latter. However, if those are not codiﬁed, it is not obvious whether
this can be easily done, for example, if vocabulary of precisely deﬁned and commonly
understood terms is lacking. Cowan et al. (2000) refer to this situation as the lack of
a ’code-book’. This case however will not be the main focus of the analysis. Hence,
we will proceed with marginal considerations and thereafter address the case with en-
try costs f that have to be paid once when setting up the structures for knowledge
codiﬁcation. In each period, the case with assumption (A2) can then be interpreted
as the previous one with the peculiarity that the entry costs are growing as long as
the economy does not codify. Let the case with (A2’) and f = 0 be the standard
situation. This means agents are able to just codify ideas with positive marginal value
in t+1 without any entry costs. We will make explicit notion when fading in f or (A2).










































Changing stocks of knowledge and information possess a direct and an indirect eﬀect
via Kt+1 on 4Ce,t. For convenience, we subsume the indirect eﬀect in dKt+1 and will
refer to the direct eﬀect when speaking of inﬂuences of the knowledge stock or the stock
of information on knowledge codiﬁcation in period t. From (9) it is obvious that the
direct eﬀect of a marginal increase in Ct is either zero, if the maximum term is zero39,






























νβ + q < 0,Ct > τt.
The direct eﬀect of knowledge growth on codiﬁcation is negative because it increases
the rent which, in turn, increases opportunity costs for codiﬁcation. In contrast, an
increasing knowledge stock has no direct eﬀect on the codiﬁcation beneﬁt, because
the rent in t + 1 is linear in τt+1
40. Choosing a marginally higher level of capital


































Inserting this condition into (9), we can estimate from above the values of 4Ce,t for














α2ε − ν(1 + ε)
νβ
qτt
−max{0,Ct − qτt} < 0.
It shows that a negative partial derivative with respect to Kt+1 would imply 4Ce,t < 0,
which we precluded by assumption. Further, we can formulate
39Note that in this case the indirect eﬀect via Kt+1 is also 0. Of course the clause above holds an
inaccuracy since if Ct = qτt, the maximum term would be zero but the partial derivative of 4Ce,t





∂τt = 0. This is due to the model showing Solow neutral technological
progress. With other speciﬁcations of technological progress an increasing knowledge stock directly
decreases the marginal codiﬁcation beneﬁt.
25Lemma 1 There exists a single-valued function Kt+1,crit : IR+ × IR+ → IR+, which
gives the amount of the capital stock in t + 1, Kt+1,crit(τt,Ct), such that 4Ce,t = 0.





















γt − (1 − α)
[α2ε−ν(1+ε)]qτt−νβ max{0,Ct−qτt}
νβKt+1 > 0.
Using the implicit function theorem proves lemma 1. 2
Lemma 2 Let U ⊂ IR
3
+ be the set {(τt,Ct,Kt+1)|4Ce,t(τt,Ct,Kt+1) ≥ 0}. 4Ce,t is a
strictly increasing function of Kt+1 on U.





















γt − (1 − α)
[α2ε−ν(1+ε)]qτt−νβ max{0,Ct−qτt}
νβKt+1 > 0.
From lemma 1, we know that Kt+1,crit(τt,Ct) is continuous, and since the partial deriva-
tive of 4Ce,t with respect to Kt+1 can only be negative for 4Ce,t < 0, U must be a
connected subspace of IR
3
+. 2
The previous lemmata apply to the marginal consideration leaving out possible entry
costs of knowledge codiﬁcation f and/or γt4Cie,t. In order to address this case, it is
necessary to distinguish the two situations which the agent compares in her decision
process. As mentioned previously, from a representative household perspective, the
decision on knowledge codiﬁcation does not depend on whether the ﬁxed entry costs
originate from having to create information of zero marginal productivity in the next
period due to assumption (A2) or from set up costs f or both. This is because in the
situation with (A2) the household does not take into account that if it did not codify,
the next generation would have to pay even higher entry costs. Hence, in the following
lemma, total ﬁxed costs are just denoted by ˜ f, which may originate from both, (A2)
and f, that is, in general ˜ ft = f + γt4Cie,t.42
For a given budget wt:
41Note that α2 − ν < 0 for α ∈ (0,1).
42Of course, if in a previous period the entry costs f have already been paid, ˜ ft reduces to γt4Cie,t.
26(S1) The representative agent does not pay the entry costs of knowledge codiﬁcation
and, hence, invests in physical capital only. Her optimal choice of physical capital
saving in a period t is denoted by ¯ Kt+1. The generation of period t will then realize
life time utility of
u[wt − ¯ Kt+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0)) ¯ Kt+1] =: U
woC
t .
(S2) The household pays entry costs ˜ ft and chooses the optimal pair ( ˆ Kt+1,4 ˆ Ce,t).
Lifetime utility in this case can be written as
u[wt − ˜ ft − ˆ Kt+1 − γt4 ˆ Ce,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4 ˆ Ce,t)) ˆ Kt+1] =: U
C
t ,
for wt ≥ ˜ ft, and let UC
t (wt < ˜ ft) := UC
t (wt = 0).
Note that the household’s optimization problem possesses unique solutions in both
situations (see Appendix A).
Lemma 3 For every (τt,Ct, ˜ ft) ∈ R3
+ exists a unique ( ˆ Kt+1,crit, ¯ Kt+1,crit) such that
UC
t = UwoC
t . For all ˆ Kt+1 > ˆ Kt+1,crit(τt,Ct, ˜ f), UC
t > UwoC
t .
The detailed proof can be found in appendix C.
As a direct consequence of the lemmata, we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 1 An overlapping generations economy with C1 ≤ qτ1, where τ1 > 0, and
an initial stock of capital K1 close enough to zero will not be codifying at the beginning
of its development.
Proof. In other words, one can always ﬁnd a K1 such that for all τ1 there exists a time
interval I = {t|1 ≤ t ≤ T} in which 4Ce,t = 0. It is suﬃcient to show that there
is no incentive to codify in the ﬁrst period from a marginal perspective, leaving out
entry costs. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that if Kt+1 < Kt+1,crit(τt,Ct), the economy
realizes the corner solution 4Ce,t = 0 (4Ce,t would be negative which is precluded
by assumption). It follows from Lemma 1 and
∂4Ce,t
∂τt < 0 that Kt+1,crit(τt,Ct) is an
increasing function of τt. Hence, for any τ1 ∈ R++, the economy will not be codifying in
the ﬁrst period if K2 ≤ Kt+1,crit(τ1,C1). Equation (9) implies that Kt+1,crit(τ1,C1) > 0.
Consequently there exists a positive K2 ≤ Kt+1,crit(τ1,C1). Since Kt+1 = stwt, st bound
from above and wt for given τt a continuous function of Kt where wt(Kt = 0) = 0, one
can always ﬁnd an initial value K1 close enough to zero such that K2 ≤ Kt+1,crit(τ1,C1)
and hence 4Ce,1 = 0. 2
The intuition of the proof is the same as for lemma 1. That is, the Inada conditions
hold for physical capital saving, but not for knowledge codiﬁcation as the members of
the succeeding generation are exogenously transferred a positive share of the previous
27period’s knowledge stock and hence, the marginal beneﬁt of the ﬁrst idea to be codiﬁed
is ﬁnite.
Knowing that there will be no knowledge codiﬁcation at the beginning of its develop-
ment, we are now interested on whether the overlapping generations economy will be
codifying in the long run. ”Codifying in the long run” or ”codifying from some point in
time on” means that there does not exist a period t0, such that for all t > t0,4Ce,t = 0.
Proposition 2 With constant codiﬁcation costs, an overlapping generations economy
will be codifying in the long run if either of the following conditions is satisﬁed:
(i) The steady-state growth rate of capital is higher than that of the knowledge stock
(or equivalently α > 0.5).
(ii) The steady-state growth rate of capital is equal to that of the knowledge stock (or














εq(α2 − ν) − νq
νβkwoC






s is the steady-state level of kt = Kt
τt without codiﬁcation.
Proof. We will prove this result by contradiction. The intuition is the following. No
codiﬁcation implies that the economy approaches steady-state growth. It also requires
that ∀t > t0, (τt,Ct,Kt+1) / ∈ U. If (i), steady-state growth causes Kt+1 to grow more
than Kt+1,crit, ∀t. If (ii), the steady state level of k involves Kt+1 > Kt+1,crit. Hence,
for (i) and (ii), steady state growth and no codiﬁcation are contradictory implying that
the economy will be codifying in the long run.
With regard to (i), suppose an economy characterized by α > 0.5 will not codify in the
long run. That is, ∃t0, such that ∀t > t0, 4Ce,t = 0. Consequently, the overlapping
generations economy must approach steady-state growth where gK,s = α
1−αgτ,s. α > 0.5
implies that gK,s > gτ,s.
Further let 4Ce,t0 = 0. No codiﬁcation in the long run means that it is optimal for














νβ and B =
νq−(α2−ν)εq
νβ > 0. Since by assumption the economy
does not codify, we can drop the maximum term without loss of generality43 and rewrite
43From 4Ce,t = 0 by assumption and τt growing at a constant rate, it follows that the maximum
term must be 0 from some point in time on. However, since max{0,Ct − qτt} ≤ (1 − q)τt, we could










For t → ∞ both sides of the equation grow without bound. As the economy is growing
with constant rates in the long run, (11) will hold for all t if the left hand side is
growing at a rate lower than or equal to that of the right hand side. Dividing both
sides by τt and log-diﬀerentiating gives












Inserting the relation of the steady-state growth rates of capital and knowledge (gK,s =
α
1−αgτ,s) transforms the above inequality into
gK,s ≤ gτ,s or α ≤ 1 − α.
This contradicts the presumption of gK,s > gτ,s or α > 0.5, respectively.
Consider (ii) where gK,s = gτ,s. Again suppose the economy does not codify but
satisﬁes (10). Without codiﬁcation the economy approaches steady-state behavior in
the long run, which implies kt = constant. Note that with CIES-utility the steady-
state equilibrium without knowledge codiﬁcation is unique. In accordance with the
household’s utility maximization, no codiﬁcation in the long run involves that ∀t > t0,
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This contradicts (10). As a consequence, the conditions of proposition 2 preclude that
there is a t0 such that ∀t > t0, 4Ce,t = 0. Hence, the economy will codify in the long
run. 2
Intuitively speaking, a higher growth rate of capital as compared to that of knowledge
implies that the marginal product of capital declines faster than the marginal beneﬁt
of knowledge codiﬁcation. As a consequence, at some point the representative agent
uses some of her capital savings to invest in knowledge codiﬁcation. However, when
assuming that α ≈ 0.3 as often suggested in empirical work, the present result could not
explain the observed eﬀorts for knowledge codiﬁcation. But instead of being costant, it
seems plausible that the costs of knowledge codiﬁcation decreased over the last decades.
In the analysis, we thus want to allow for codiﬁcation costs that decline monotonically
over time at a constant rate gγ. We can then state the following result.
29Proposition 3 An overlapping generations economy will be codifying in the long run
if the steady-state growth rate of knowledge exceeds that of capital by less than the rate
at which the codiﬁcation costs decline.
Proof. The proof uses a similar reasoning as that of proposition 2. Suppose the economy
does not codify in the long run and gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ. Let 4Ce,t0 = 0. Further, (11)
must hold ∀t > t0. Neglecting the maximum term in (11) and log-diﬀerentiating yields












Without codiﬁcation the economy approaches steady state behavior. Inserting the
relation of the steady state growth rates, the inequality above can be written as
gτ,s − gK,s ≥ −gγ.
This contradicts gτ,s − gK,s < −gγ. 2
It further follows:
Corollary 1 Every overlapping generations economy will be codifying from some point
in time on if the rate at which the codiﬁcation costs decline is greater than or equal to
the steady-state growth rate of the knowledge stock.

















, −gγ > 2gτ,s.
gτ,s ≤ −gγ < 2gτ,s implies that for the economy to not codify in the long run, α must
be smaller than or equal to 0. If −gγ > 2gτ,s, α must exceed 1 for zero codiﬁcation.
This contradicts that for all overlapping generations economies α ∈ (0,1). 2
It can be seen from the proof of corollary 1 that an α < 0.5 is also consistent with
knowledge codiﬁcation in the long run as long as the codiﬁcation costs are declining
fast enough. Having discussed under what conditions the economy will start to codify
sometime, the following proposition focuses on full codiﬁcation, that is, at the end
of each period t, Ct+1 = τt. For simplicity of the argument, let −gγ < 2gτ,s for the
remainder of the paper without loss of generality.
30Proposition 4 An overlapping generations economy in steady state equilibrium that










Proof. First, as shown in the proof of proposition 3, an overlapping generations economy
that satisﬁes the condition given in proposition 4 will start to codify at some point.
The number of eﬀective ideas to be codiﬁed 4Ce,t is chosen according to (9), which
can be written as









t − B. (13)
Since the economy is assumed to be in steady state, 4Ce,t must be greater than 0
(because (12) precludes a steady state where 4Ce,t = 0). Hence, above’s equality must
hold as long as 4Ce,t possesses an interior solution. Being in steady state, both sides















Inserting the steady state relation of the growth rates of knowledge and capital trans-
forms the above equation into
g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s − gτ,s =
Kt+1








As the denominator of the right hand side is positive (because 4Ce,t > 0), the entire
fraction will be positive whenever gK,s − gτ,s − gγ > 0. The latter can be directly
transformed into the condition given in the proposition. The right side being positive
implies that the amount of ideas to be codiﬁed grows faster than the knowledge stock.
This violates the steady state condition that for 4Ce,t > 0, g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s = gτ,s.
The only possibility to satisfy this condition is for 4Ce,t + max{0,Ct − qτt} to realize
its upper bound at (1−q)τt as a corner solution. Consequently, an economy in steady







must be codifying fully.
Note also that in the case of ﬁxed codiﬁcation costs an economy in steady state is
codifying fully if α > 0.5, that is, if gK,s > gτ,s. 2
We can then summarize:
31Corollary 2 If gτ,s − gK,s 6= gγ, an overlapping generations economy in steady state
exhibits either full or zero codiﬁcation in the long run.
Proof. This corollary is an immediate consequence of propositions 3 and 4. If gτ,s −
gK,s > gγ, full codiﬁcation directly follows from proposition 4.
With regard to gτ,s − gK,s < gγ, the proof of proposition 3 implies that this condition
is contradictory to 4Ce,t > 0, ∀t. Hence, the economy cannot realize steady-state
growth with positive codiﬁcation. From proposition 3’s proof further follows that if an
economy shows steady state behavior ∀t > t0 and 4Ce,t0 = 0, then 4Ce,t = 0, ∀t > t0.
As a consequence, only steady state growth without codiﬁcation is consistent with the
condition gτ,s − gK,s < gγ.
2
The section precluded possible entry costs to knowledge codiﬁcation until now. The
following proposition considers ﬁxed entry costs that have to be paid once at the
beginning of knowledge codiﬁcation as a kind of set-up costs.
Proposition 5 An overlapping generations economy that started to codify without ﬁxed
entry costs to knowledge codiﬁcation will also do so with ﬁxed entry costs.
Proof. The question to be answered is whether, given the conditions under which
an overlapping generations economy without ﬁxed entry costs codiﬁed in the long run,
there is a period in which the representative household receives a higher life time utility
by paying the ﬁxed entry costs to knowledge codiﬁcation and choosing its optimal
amount of capital saving and codiﬁcation investment than by just saving capital. This
is eﬀectively a comparison of (S1) and (S2). (S2) can only yield higher life time utility
if there is positive knowledge codiﬁcation, otherwise the ﬁxed costs were just wasted.
Hence, the ﬁrst question is: would some period’s representative agent be willing to
codify if she had to pay the ﬁxed costs. That is, would it be optimal in (S2) to choose
a positive amount of knowledge codiﬁcation after having paid the ﬁxed costs. If so,





all wt > w∗(f). As w∗(f) is ﬁnite and wt will grow to inﬁnity, this second condition
will be given sometime if the ﬁrst will hold.
Hence, consider an economy in (S2) where the representative agent has to pay ﬁxed
costs f when young and thereafter decides on the optimal amount of saving and codi-
ﬁcation. The constraints of her utility maximization problem can then be transformed
into
c1,t = wnet,t(1 − st − ςt),
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)stwnet,t,
where wnet,t = wt − f. Suppose the economy will not codify for all t. Then the saving
rate is a function of rt+1 only. As gτ,t = gwoC
τ = const. and gC,t = 0, the economy’s
32dynamics are reﬂected by




t F − f).






kt+1 = stwnet,t = stk
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1−α is decreasing at a constant rate. As st is bound
on the interval [slow,1), we can estimate it from above by 1. Hence, the last term of
kt+1 in the above equation becomes arbitrarily small for large enough t. Consequently
the diﬀerence equation approaches that of an economy without ﬁxed costs in the limit.
Being interested in long term behavior, this last term can be neglected for an appro-
priately large t and the previous propositions apply for positive codiﬁcation in (S2) in
the long run. 2
Fixed entry costs that have to be paid once only delay an economy’s knowledge cod-
iﬁcation but do not prevent it. This may be diﬀerent in the hypothetical case with
assumption (A2). This assumption implies that the codiﬁcation decision may depend
on the economy’s codiﬁcation history as previous generations that did not codify ac-
cumulated entry costs for later generations.










will be codifying in the long run and independent of its codiﬁcation history if either of



































τ ) − 1 + α

> 0,
and F = (1 − α)1−αα2α(εq)α(1 + gwoC
τ )−α,
Proof. The proof’s reasoning is similar to that of proposition 5. No codiﬁcation in the
long run implies that the representative agent must prefer (S1) to (S2) for all t > t0,
where t0 large enough. In (S1) the economy approaches steady state behavior with-










if either (i) or (ii) holds. As compared to the proof of proposition 5, an
additional diﬃculty is that the codiﬁcation history enters the representative agents de-
cision problem. In this respect, independence of the codiﬁcation history means that the
economy would start to codify in some period t even if it possessed no information at
all, Ct = 0. This involves the maximum entry costs in period t of γtqτt. Consequently,
if the economy starts to codify under this condition, it must do so with lower entry
costs, as well.
The formal argument proceeds as follows. In a ﬁrst step, we again verify that even
if the maximum entry costs had to be paid in (S2), the economy would like to codify
eventually. Second, we show that under the conditions given in the proposition and
given the economy would not codify, the hypothetical utility if the representative agent
chose (S2) instead of (S1) would satisfy dUC
t > dUwoC
t from some point in time t1 on.
Hence, there must be a t2, where UC
t2 > UwoC
t2 , contradicting the assumption that the
economy does not codify in the long run.
The detailed proof is provided upon request.
4 Conclusions
This paper has developed a formal model of endogenous growth that incorporated
costly knowledge codiﬁcation as a means of intergenerational knowledge transfer. The
motivation was that in contrast to the usual models of endogenous growth, which treat
knowledge codiﬁcation as a by-product of research and development activities, great
eﬀorts of private ﬁrms for the purposeful codiﬁcation of knowledge can be observed.
We ﬁnd that although knowledge codiﬁcation positively inﬂuences an economy’s long-
run growth rate of output, initially there will be no knowledge codiﬁcation in an econ-
omy that develops from a small level of capital. This is due to the Inada conditions
applying to physical capital saving, but not to investment in knowledge codiﬁcation.
We have consequently examined under which conditions knowledge codiﬁcation takes
place in the long run. It has been shown that an overlapping generations economy with
constant codiﬁcation costs will be codifying from some point in time on if the steady-
state growth rate of capital is higher than that of the knowledge stock, or equivalently,
if the exponent of the capital stock in the aggregate production function, α, is greater
than 0.5. The intuition is that with the capital stock increasing at a higher rate than
the knowledge stock, the marginal productivity of knowledge increases relative to that
of capital and it will become worthwhile to forgo consumption for preserving ideas by
knowledge codiﬁcation. For equal steady-state growth rates of capital and knowledge,
the economy will codify if the steady state relation of capital and knowledge is large
enough. Assuming an empirically often suggested α ≈ 0.3, this result could not explain
the recently observed eﬀorts for knowledge codiﬁcation. However, allowing for mono-
tonically decreasing codiﬁcation costs over time, it is suﬃcient for long-run knowledge
codiﬁcation that the steady-state growth rate of knowledge exceeds that of capital by
34less than the rate at which the codiﬁcation costs decline. In this case, an α < 0.5 would
be consistent with knowledge codiﬁcation in the long run. In fact, if the rate at which
the codiﬁcation costs decline is even higher than the steady-state growth rate of the
knowledge stock, every overlapping generations economy will sooner or later engage in
costly knowledge codiﬁcation.
These results do not change when additionally considering ﬁxed entry costs to knowl-
edge codiﬁcation. The entry costs will only delay but not prevent the codiﬁcation
investment. This may be diﬀerent in the rather hypothetical case with assumption
(A2), in which for an idea to be codiﬁed the more basic ideas it builds upon have to
be codiﬁed ﬁrst. This implies that the entry costs of knowledge codiﬁcation increase
as long as the economy does not codify. Whether the above conditions for knowledge
codiﬁcation are still suﬃcient depends on the speciﬁc form of the representative house-
hold’s utility function.
The analysis implies several issues for future research. One would certainly be to
further elaborate on the inter-temporal externalities knowledge codiﬁcation gives rise
to. For example, later generations may be able to utilize information that has been
created by generations which already passed away, such that no direct compensation is
possible. Hence, a normative analysis from a benevolent planner’s perspective should
be one of the desiderata. Another interesting aspect would be to consider diﬀerent
market structures in the intermediate sector and study their implications for knowledge
codiﬁcation and long-run economic growth.
APPENDIX
A Suﬃcient Conditions for the Household’s Opti-
mization Problem
A suﬃcient condition for a unique maximum of the household’s optimization problem
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The eigenvalues of H will be negative at the critical points given by
M1 = −u
0(c1,t) + δu












if the ﬁrst principal minor is negative and the second principal minor is positive. The








This implies the unique maximum in (S1), that is without knowledge codiﬁcation. The




























































rt+1 linearly depends on τt+1 and so does τt+1 on 4Ce,t. Hence,
∂2rt+1
∂4C2














































1−ςt . It is always satisﬁed for θ ≥ 0.5. 2
36B Allocation of Labor in Temporary Equilibrium
This section examines under which conditions the equilibrium allocation of labor pos-
sesses an inner solution with positive research. Generally, the question is under which








where τt is a function of LR,t(= 1 − LA,t).
Due to the Inada conditions of the aggregate production function, LA,t > 0.
To examine whether LA,t < 1, the intuition is that since the right hand side of equation
(15) is monotonically increasing in τt, there must be a τcrit such that LA,t = 1. Con-
sequently, the labor market realizes corner solutions for all periods t where τt > τcrit
and positive research in all periods t where τt < τcrit. Therefore, we ask what is the
highest level of knowledge that can be reached in each period t and then examine the
allocation in the labor market. If the respective allocation shows positive research, we
can be sure to also have an inner solution for lower levels of the knowledge stock. As
shown in section 2.8, the highest knowledge stock in each period t is realized with full




τt−1(q + β(1 − q) + εq(1 − LA,t))
qετt−1
.




q + β(1 − q)
qε
.
C Proof of Lemma 3
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we ascertain that for planned capital saving
Kt+1 > Kt+1,crit
44, the representative agent would be willing to pay entry costs for cod-
iﬁcation up to a certain amount. In a second step, we identify the uniqueness of a w∗
t
for every amount of ﬁxed costs which leaves the agent just indiﬀerent between paying
entry costs for codiﬁcation or investing in capital only. The uniqueness of the solutions
( ˆ Kt+1,4 ˆ Ce,t), ¯ Kt+1 to the household’s optimization problem for every wt yields the
lemma’s contention.
If ˜ ft = 0, lemma 1 implies ˆ Kt+1,crit = ¯ Kt+1,crit = Kt+1,crit. Further, from lemma 2 we
know that if ˆ Kt+1 > ˆ Kt+1,crit, UC
t > UwoC
t . That is,
u[wt − ˆ Kt+1 − γt4 ˆ Ce,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4 ˆ Ce,t)) ˆ Kt+1]
> u[wt − ¯ Kt+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0)) ¯ Kt+1].
44Kt+1,crit represents the critical value of saving without entry costs as introduced by the previous
lemmata.
37The representative household’s budget is its wage wt. Fixed costs would reduce the
budget the agent can allocate for consumption, physical capital saving and knowledge
codiﬁcation. A reduction of the resources to allocate must reduce utility. The reason
is that utility is assumed to strictly increase in consumption. Hence reducing the bud-
get by one unit of the homogeneous good, the agent must abstain from one unit of
consumption when young, if she wants to realize the same allocation ( ˆ Kt+1,4 ˆ Ce,t) as
before or she chooses another optimal pair ( ˆ K0
t+1,4 ˆ C0
e,t), which must lead to less life-
time utility, because otherwise it is not possible that her previous choice ( ˆ Kt+1,4 ˆ Ce,t)







Since being able to choose a pair ( ˆ Kt+1,4 ˆ Ce,t), when ˆ Kt+1 > ˆ Kt+1,crit, instead of ¯ Kt+1
leads to higher lifetime utility, utility is continuous in the budget constraint wt and
U(wt = 0) ≤ 0, there must be a unique wnet,t such that
u[wnet,t − ˆ Kt+1 − γt4 ˆ Ce,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4 ˆ Ce,t)) ˆ Kt+1]
= u[wt − ¯ Kt+1] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0)) ¯ Kt+1].
Hence, the representative household is willing to pay a maximum entry cost of wt −
wnet,t =: ˜ fmax. With this result, we deﬁne:
4Ut(wt, ˜ ft) := u[wt − ˜ ft − ˆ Kt+1 − γt4 ˆ Ce,t] + δu[(1 + rt+1(4 ˆ Ce,t)) ˆ Kt+1]
−u[wt − ¯ Kt+1] − δu[(1 + rt+1(4Ce,t = 0)) ¯ Kt+1]
= U
C







t = St + ζt be the total amount of investment in t without ﬁxed costs.45 In the
situation where the household does not codify ¯ Σ0
t = St = ¯ Kt+1 and in (S2) ˆ Σ0
t =





The argument is that the representative household chooses Σ0




t . Relaxing the budget constraint by one unit would decrease u0(c1,t)
when keeping Σ0
t constant. If Σ0




Hence, equalling out marginal utility, the agent must enhance total investment. We
further know from Lemma 2 that for ˆ Kt+1 > Kt+1,crit, it is optimal to invest in cod-
iﬁcation. Hence, when relaxing the budget constraint by one unit, the increase in
45By this, ζt = γt4Ce,t.
38lifetime utility with knowledge codiﬁcation must be greater than without. That is, if






















Consequently, 4Ut(wt, ˜ ft) = 0 implicitly deﬁnes a function w∗
t : R++ → R++ which
gives the wage for every ﬁxed cost level ˜ ft such that the representative household enjoys











t( ˜ ft) is strictly increasing in ˜ ft.
In the case with (A2), the knowledge stock τt and the stock of information Ct determine
entry costs γt4Cie,t. Hence, at w∗
t(γt4Cie,t), 4Ut = 0. The fact that there is a unique
choice of ( ˆ Kt+1,4 ˆ Ce,t) and ¯ Kt+1 for every wt completes the proof.









dwt > 0 and Lemma 2. 2
D Existence of Non-Trivial Steady States
In this section of the appendix, we show that diﬀerent steady states with positive
growth rates exist, and that the overlapping generations economy must exhibit steady
state behavior in the long run in the case of zero codiﬁcation. By the attribute ”non-
trivial”, we intend to preclude K1 = 0 which would imply Kt = 0, ∀t.










τt+1 = νqτt + νβ(4Ce,t + max{0,Ct − qτt}) + νεqτt,
Ct+1 = Ct + 4Cie,t + 4Ce,t.
The respective growth rates are
gK,t = stK
α−1






39gτ,t = νq + νβ
4Ce,t + max{0,Ct − qτt}
τt





The growth rates change from one period to the next according to
dgK,t = stK
α−1





t−1(gs,t − (1 − α)gK,t + αgτ,t−1),
dgτ,t = νβ







Being deﬁned by constant growth rates, steady states imply (dgK,t,dgτ,t,dgC,t) =
(0,0,0), ∀t. Consequently, there are two kinds of non-trivial steady states.
1. Steady state without codiﬁcation
If the economy does not codify, 4Ce,t+max{0,Ct−qτt} = 0 and 4Cie,t+4Ce,t =
0. This implies gC,s = 0 and gτ,s = gwoC
τ .
As st is bound on [slow,1), the saving rate cannot grow at a constant rate other
than 0. Consequently, gK,s = α
1−αgτ,s. Therefore, a steady state without codiﬁ-







τ = νq(1 + ε) − 1,
gC,s = 0.
2. Steady state with codiﬁcation
Positive codiﬁcation implies 4Ce,t > 0. Therefore, the overlapping generations
economy can only realize steady state behavior if gC,s = g4Cie+4Ce,s and gτ,s =
g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s. By the same argument with respect to the saving rate as
in the case with zero codiﬁcation, the relation of the growth rates of capital
and knowledge will be gK,s = α








where 4Ct = 4Cie,t +4Ce,t. Note that a steady state with full codiﬁcation is a
special case where gτ,s = gwC
τ = g4Ce+max{0,C−qτ},s = gC,s = g4C,s = ν(q(1 + ε) +
β(1 − q)) − 1.
40We will now show that without codiﬁcation, the overlapping generations economy will





. Knowing that in steady
state gK,s = α
1−αgτ,s, kt = const., ∀t, is a necessary condition for the economy to be in
steady state. Assuming no codiﬁcation implies gC,t = 0 and gτ,t = gwoC
τ = constant.
In this case, kt = constant is also suﬃcient for steady state behavior of the economy.
Hence, we can summarize the economy’s dynamics by the following ﬁrst order diﬀerence
equation:













1−α (1 − α)1−αα2α(εq)α.
With CIES-utility, the representative household’s saving rate without knowledge cod-


















τ ) − 1 + α














This equation possesses a unique solution for kwoC
s . It can further be easily veriﬁed that
in the case of zero knowledge codiﬁcation the aggregate production function satisﬁes
the suﬃcient conditions to not approach an equilibrium of global contraction for initial
values k1 > 0 (for such conditions see e.g. Galor and Ryder (1989)).
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